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Abstract 
 
Leaving the European Union will entail for UK regions losing access to the EU Cohesion Policy. 
Have EU funds been effective in the country, and what may be the consequences of an 
interruption of EU financial support to the UK’s poorer regions? This paper studies the impact 
of ‘Objective 1’ funding – the highest form of EU aid – in Cornwall and South Yorkshire, two 
of the UK’s most subsidised regions. We employ synthetic control, matching and difference-
in-differences methodologies in order to assess the labour market and economic performance 
of the two regions. The results indicate that Cornwall and South Yorkshire performed better 
than counterfactual comparisons throughout the period in which they were classified as 
Objective 1. Unlike Cornwall, South Yorkshire lost Objective 1 eligibility in 2006 and this 
massively reduced its share of EU funds. Our findings indicate that, after 2006, South Yorkshire 
was unable to sustain the gains obtained in previous years. This suggests that while Structural 
Funds may be effectively improving socio-economic conditions of poorer regions, the 
performance of subsidised areas could be deeply affected by a reduction (or worse, an 
interruption) of EU aid. 
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Gaining and losing EU Objective 1 funds: 
Regional development in Britain and the 
prospect of Brexit  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. ‘Brexit’ 
received high support from some of the UK regions that have been among the 
largest beneficiaries of EU Structural Funds. This reflects discontent with the 
EU and the way in which EU financial resources have been spent, and would 
seem to imply that EU Cohesion Policy has not succeeded in triggering greater 
development in these regions. But has this been the case? When (and if) the UK 
leaves the EU, these areas will no longer be eligible to receive EU funds, and 
the shift from a status of high subsidisation to one in which no more European 
funds are available may bring about a number of unexpected consequences. 
Might the loss of EU funding have any adverse impacts on future employment 
levels and economic performance of currently subsidised regions? 
In order to answer these questions we look at two UK regions, Cornwall and 
South Yorkshire, which voted to leave the EU in the referendum on Brexit1 
despite being among the highest recipients of EU funds in the country. 
Cornwall has been and continues to be eligible for ‘Objective 1’ funding, the 
most significant form of EU financial help. The region began to be classified as 
Objective 1 in 2000 and has continued to be funded since then. Therefore, the 
flow of EU funds will be interrupted if and when the UK leaves the European 
                                                 
 
1  56% of Cornwall’s and 61% of South Yorkshire’s voting population favoured leaving the 
European Union in the referendum on Brexit, held on 23rd June 2016. 
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Union. Conversely, South Yorkshire was heavily supported in the past but lost 
its eligibility for this stream of funding in 2006. The particular evolution of this 
region’s eligibility status allows us to investigate how the loss of Objective 1 
funding affected its economy, learning relevant lessons on the potential impact 
of a similar loss in Cornwall and in other highly funded regions. 
We study the effects of EU Objective 1 funds in these two regions using 
counterfactual methods. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we 
provide evidence on the causal impacts of Objective 1 programmes and observe 
how the policy effects evolve over time; second, following an increasingly 
common approach in place-based policy evaluations (see Neumark and 
Simpson, 2015), we analyse the impact of policy interventions taking into 
account both the period in which the implementation takes place and the 
period following the programme’s completion. By looking at the performance 
of regions after Objective 1 eligibility is lost, our analysis examines the 
persistency of the policy’s impacts and investigates its capacity to produce self-
sustaining regional development paths. The few works evaluating the impact 
of EU Cohesion Policy with counterfactual techniques have documented the 
potential for Objective 1 transfers to foster growth, spur investments, and 
generate jobs (Becker et al., 2010; 2013; Pellegrini et al., 2013; Giua, 2016). Only 
very recently, has scholarly research begun to examine the post-policy impacts 
of Objective 1 funds (Barone et al., 2016). However, no study has ever 
investigated the effects of these policies by considering their full cycle, i.e. from 
the moment in which a region is awarded the Objective 1 status to the period 
following the loss of Objective 1 funds. 
We compare the trajectory of Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the one of 
‘synthetic’ control regions created as the combination of English regions not 
eligible for Objective 1 funds. Our findings provide clear evidence of a 
significant reduction in unemployment in Cornwall, relative to the synthetic 
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control, during the period in which it was classified as Objective 1. South 
Yorkshire also displays a significant decrease in unemployment between 2000 
and 2006, but the improvements are gradually offset during the following 
years. Our estimates suggest that after Objective 1 status is lost, South 
Yorkshire evolves towards the trend of a similar untreated region, indicating 
that Objective 1 funds produced very little permanent/structural effects overall. 
Difference-in-differences models of local unemployment growth estimated at 
the level of wards confirm this evidence. In addition, Cornwall appears to be 
closing the gap in GDP per capita relative to untreated regions during the 
Objective 1 period, while South Yorkshire’s economic catch-up process loses 
pace and begins to revert when Objective 1 funds are no longer available. 
Overall, the results indicate that Cohesion Policy has had a positive impact on 
the creation of jobs and the promotion of economic growth in poorer UK 
regions. However, these outcomes may not be persistent, and they may quickly 
disappear after the end of the high-intensity funding period, even in presence 
of transitional programmes that make the reduction of EU funds more gradual. 
Hence, the sudden interruption of Structural Funds to poorer regions that 
would result from Brexit could have relevant medium-run consequences on the 
economy and labour market of areas currently receiving the highest 
proportions of EU funds. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces the background of the 
Objective 1 programme and reviews the literature on EU Cohesion Policy 
evaluations; Section III presents the quasi-experimental design; Section IV 
discusses the data and descriptive statistics; Section V presents the empirical 
results, beginning with the study performed at the regional level using the 
synthetic control method, and followed by the difference-in-differences model 
estimated at the level of wards; Section VI relates the empirical results to the 
EU Objective 1 funds in Britain and the prospect of Brexit 
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investment strategies of the two analysed regions; Section VII concludes by 
summarising the results and defining some paths for future research. 
 
 
2. Institutional background and overview of the literature 
Objective 1 programme. The European Cohesion Policy was established in 
1988 as a set of regional investment programmes aiming to promote social and 
economic cohesion in the EU. Starting from the 1994-1999 EU investment 
period, Cohesion Policy expenditures represent approximately one third of the 
EU’s total budget. Periodic variations have changed the way in which regions 
are classified for Cohesion Policy purposes. At the beginning of every new 
programming period, the European Commission revises the regional allocation 
of funds and the list of regions considered ‘in most need of support’. The 
eligibility rule for determining ‘Objective 1’ status – i.e. ‘Regions whose 
development is lagging behind’ (European Commission, 2008a) – has always 
remained the same. 2  Objective 1 regions, receiving the large majority of 
Structural Funds3, are those whose average GDP per head is below 75% of the 
EU average for the last three years of available data before the start of a new 
programming period (Gripaios and Bishop, 2006). 
Under the Objective 1 programme, regions are entitled to be financed through 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund 
(ESF), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), and 
                                                 
 
2 The name ‘Objective 1’ regions was changed into ‘Convergence regions’ for the 2007-2013 period 
and again into ‘Less developed regions’ for 2014-2020, but the rule of eligibility has not been 
modified. 
3 Objective 1 regions received 71.6% of the total 2000-2006 Cohesion Policy budget (€213bn), 
despite representing only 37% of the total EU population (European Commission, 2010). For the 
2007-2013 period the proportion of funds to ‘Convergence regions’ was increased to 82% 
(European Commission, 2008b). 
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the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).4 Among these, the most 
important sources of funding are the ERDF and the ESF. While the 
development goals to be achieved in each Objective 1 region vary according to 
specific regional plans, there exist a number of broad themes on which the 
ERDF and the ESF focus. Generally, the former fund is used for developing 
new infrastructure, fostering the competitiveness of SMEs, and promoting 
technological development and innovation, while the latter aims to improve 
employment opportunities, equip the workforce with better skills and better 
job prospects, and help unemployed and inactive people enter work (European 
Commission, 2008a). 
The share of available financial resources is established before the beginning of 
each 7-year programming period by the European Commission on the basis of 
development plans jointly defined with the regions’ managing authorities. 
Every managing authority is in charge of providing information on the 
programmes, advertising and selecting projects, and monitor their 
implementation. Depending on the type of project, the beneficiaries of the 
funds can be local Governments, education institutions, other public entities, 
enterprises, non-governmental organisations, or private citizens. 
Regions classified as Objective 1 are expected to implement development 
programmes which would allow them to converge to higher levels of income 
and eventually lose their status of areas in highest need of support. As a 
consequence, the proportion of EU subsidies to these regions would 
progressively diminish. As the per capita GDP of Objective 1 regions becomes 
higher than 75% of the EU average, ‘Phasing-in’ or ‘Phasing-out’ transitional 
                                                 
 
4 A fifth source of funding is the Cohesion Fund, available to Objective 1 regions of Member States 
with a Gross National Income below 90% of the EU average. This rule has made UK regions not 
eligible to receive these grants.   
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programmes are put in place, reducing the amount of funds available to former 
Objective 1 regions. 
Literature. The effectiveness of Cohesion Policy has been assessed in a vast 
number of evaluations performed with many different empirical 
methodologies. The majority of studies draw on samples of EU NUTS2 regions 
and employ cross-sectional or panel data (Cappelen et al., 2003; Ederveen et al., 
2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2005; 
Ederveen et al., 2006; Puigcerver-Peñalver, 2007; Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008). 
More recent works have attempted to address endogeneity issues by using 
instrumental variable models in combination with spatial econometric 
techniques (Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Ramajo et al., 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 
2010; Bouayad-Agha et al., 2013). In spite of the large number of studies 
produced, this literature has reached no consensus on whether Structural Fund 
spending is beneficial (Cappelen et al., 2003; Bahr, 2008; Esposti and Bussoletti, 
2008; Becker et al., 2012), beneficial under some conditions (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Fratesi, 2004; Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Becker et al., 2013; Bouayad-Agha et 
al., 2013; Rodriguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015; Crescenzi and Giua, 2016), 
insignificant (Garcia-Milá and McGuire, 2001; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008) or 
even detrimental and unjustified (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Dall’erba et al., 
2009).  
In order to provide more conclusive evidence on the effect of EU funds in 
European regions, a new strand of the literature has proposed novel estimation 
methodologies based on quasi-experiments and counterfactual comparisons. 
A commonly used counterfactual approach evaluating EU Cohesion Policy 
exploits the eligibility rule for Objective 1 status as a threshold for a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD). Areas classified as Objective 1 (treated) are 
compared to similar areas with a GDP just above the 75% of the EU average. 
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Becker et al. (2010; 2013) and Pellegrini et al. (2013) use this methodology and 
find a positive and significant effect of Structural Funds on economic growth 
in Objective 1 regions, while Accetturo et al. (2014) uncover a negative impact 
of the funds on the degree of trust and cooperation among citizens. Adopting 
a spatial RDD methodology that compares areas across the boundaries of 
Objective 1 regions, Giua (2016) provides evidence on the positive and 
significant causal effect of Cohesion Policy in the municipalities of Italian 
Objective 1 regions. In these studies the effects of EU funds are assessed in a 
static framework, which does not allow for a change over time in the eligibility 
status of the regions. Whether a region is affected by reduction in the flow of 
funds deriving from the loss of Objective 1 status is a question that has been 
investigated by Barone et al. (2016), finding that the growth rate of Abruzzo 
(Italy) has significantly reduced in the period following the change in Objective 
1 eligibility. 
Increasingly, place-based policy interventions are evaluated across their full 
cycle, considering both treatment periods and post-treatment outcomes (e.g. 
Kline and Moretti, 2014; Einio and Overman, 2016). Yet, no study has ever 
looked at the impact of the EU Objective 1 programme from the moment in 
which eligibility is obtained by a region to the moment in which it is lost and 
beyond. 
We do so in this paper, by testing the long-term effect of Cohesion Policy on 
unemployment and economic growth. Unemployment is a variable that has 
already been used in the literature as a measure to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Cohesion strategies (Garcia-Milá and McGuire, 2001). In addition, other studies 
have focused on the employment effect of EU policies (Becker et al., 2010; Giua, 
2016). Economic growth is the most often used indicator to measure the success 
of Cohesion policies (e.g. Becker et al., 2010; 2013). 
EU Objective 1 funds in Britain and the prospect of Brexit 
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In addition, this paper contributes to the literature assessing the impact of 
place-based policy initiatives in the UK. While extensive research has been 
carried out to evaluate the effects of place-based policies promoted by the UK 
Government (e.g. Harris and Robinson, 2004; Devereux et al., 2007; Wren and 
Jones, 2011; Criscuolo et al., 2012; Faggio, 2015; Einio and Overman, 2016), very 
little evidence exists on the impact of European regional policies in the UK 
context. An important exception is the study by Criscuolo et al. (2012), 
investigating the role of firm subsidies granted by the British Government for 
stimulating employment in small firms of poorer regions, and finding a 
statistically insignificant correlation between Objective 1 eligibility and 
changes in firms’ employment. The scarcity of research on the effects of 
Cohesion Policy in the UK is surprising, considering that the country has been 
for a long time among the highest recipients of EU funds.5 
 
3. Cornwall and South Yorkshire as natural (policy) 
experiments 
A peculiarity of the UK context is the way in which the geography of regions 
targeted by EU Cohesion Policy has evolved over time. During the 1994-1999 
period, the UK Objective 1 regions were Merseyside in England, the Highlands 
and Islands of Scotland and Northern Ireland. For the 2000-2006 programming 
period the list of ‘lagging behind’ regions was radically modified. Of the 
aforementioned regions, only Merseyside retained Objective 1 support while 
three new regions were declared eligible: Cornwall and South Yorkshire in 
England, and West Wales and The Valleys in Wales. From 2007 Merseyside and 
South Yorkshire were no longer considered Objective 1, while Cornwall and 
                                                 
 
5 As an example, during the 2000-2006 period the UK received approximately €17 billion. Only 
Spain, Italy, Germany and Greece received more EU Funds during the same years. 
  Marco Di Cataldo 
  
9 
 
West Wales conserved the status also for the 2007-2013 and the 2014-2020 
periods (Appendix A1). 
Table 1 summarises the amount of EU funds per inhabitant6 in 1994-1999, 2000-
2006, and 2007-2013 obtained by English regions. It can be noted that all regions 
received some form of financial support, but the amount of funds awarded to 
those not eligible for Objective 1 is far lower than what was obtained by those 
considered in highest need of help.7 
Given the strict and specific criterion adopted to assign the Objective 1 status, 
variations in eligibility like the ones experienced by Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire in 2000 represent almost unique cases in the history of Cohesion 
Policy. As Objective 1 regions are expected to use Structural Funds to improve 
their economies and converge to the average level of per capita income of the 
EU, it is very unusual for regions to ‘switch’ to Objective 1 in countries that 
have been part of the EU for a long time. 
In the next paragraphs, we analyse the historical reasons that have brought 
Cornwall and South Yorkshire to be classified as Objective 1, and the evolution 
of their Cohesion Policy status from that moment until today. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
6 These figures are based on ‘payments’ from the European Commission. Payments refer to the 
resources paid by the European Commission to EU regions and are available to be spent. Although 
they do not reflect the exact final spending of regions, they represent more accurate estimates of 
actual spending than European Commission’s ‘commitments’, often used by Cohesion Policy 
evaluations as proxies for funds’ expenditures. 
7 During 1994-1999, the territory of Cornwall was classified as Objective 5b, i.e. ‘Adapt agricultural 
structures and promote the development of rural areas’, while South Yorkshire was classified as 
Objective 2, i.e. ‘Reconvert region affected by declining industry’. The fact that the two regions were 
among the top receivers of Structural Funds in England before 2000 is accounted for in the 
empirical analysis. 
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Table 1  
Annual Euros of Structural Funds per inhabitant in English regions  
1994-1999, 2000-2006 & 2007-2013   
Region 1994-1999 Region 2000-2006 Region 2007-2013a 
Merseyside* 61.9 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly* 138.0 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly* 144.6 
Tees Valley & Durham 32.1 Merseyside* 137.3 Merseyside 39.4 
Greater Manchester 28.7 South Yorkshire* 126.8 South Yorkshire 34.3 
South Yorkshire 27.5 Tees Valley & Durham 54.2 Tees Valley & Durham 22.3 
Northumberland 27.0 Northumberland 52.3 Northumberland 22.3 
Cornwall & Isles of Scilly 26.8 West Midlands 45.4 Greater Manchester  14.9 
West Midlands  26.5 Greater Manchester 44.0 Cumbria 14.2 
Cumbria 24.3 East Yorkshire 40.5 East Yorkshire 13.6 
East Yorkshire 23.5 Cumbria 36.3 North Yorkshire 13.5 
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 17.1 Devon 36.3 Lancashire 13.3 
Devon 16.1 Lincolnshire 35.5 West Yorkshire  12.8 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 14.5 Shropshire & Staffordshire 32.3 Cheshire  12.6 
West Yorkshire 10.1 Lancashire 31.0 Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 12.6 
Lancashire 9.1 West Yorkshire 30.9 Lincolnshire 12.4 
North Yorkshire 8.6 Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 30.0 Leicestershire, Rutland 11.6 
Lincolnshire 7.7 North Yorkshire 26.4 Shropshire & Staffordshire 11.4 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire 7.1 Inner London 22.2 Herefordshire, Worcestershire  11.3 
Inner London 5.3 East Anglia 21.1 West Midlands  11.2 
Kent 3.8 Herefordshire, Worcestershire 20.5 Devon 10.3 
East Anglia  3.5 Cheshire 18.3 Essex 9.6 
Cheshire 3.3 Kent 17.6 Dorset & Somerset 9.2 
Outer London  1.9 Outer London 16.6 East Anglia  8.9 
Essex 1.5 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 16.4 Outer London  8.1 
Gloucestershire, Wiltshire 1.4 Leicestershire, Rutland 16.0 Inner London 7.8 
Dorset & Somerset 1.4 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire 15.5 Kent  7.7 
Hampshire & Isle of Wight 1.3 Essex 15.3 Hampshire & Isle of Wight 7.7 
Leicestershire, Rutland 1.2 Dorset & Somerset 15.0 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire 7.7 
Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 1.1 Surrey, East & West Sussex 14.4 Surrey, East & West Sussex 7.3 
Surrey, East & West Sussex 0.9 Hampshire & Isle of Wight 13.9 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire 6.8 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire 0.8 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire 13.6 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire 5.6 
Notes: values are calculated as Structural Funds’ payments from the European Commission divided 
by regional population. Source: DG Regional Policy. * Objective 1 regions; a / provisional figures. 
Cornwall. Figure 1 plots the evolution of per capita GDP purchasing power 
standard, comparing the trends in Cornwall and South Yorkshire with the 
average of the EU as of 1999 (with 15 Member States). Between 1995 and 1999, 
Cornwall was growing at a slightly lower pace with respect to the EU15 – the 
1995-1999 average growth rate of Cornwall was 4.5%, while in the EU15 it was 
4.8%. On average, however, the growth rate of the region is comparable to that 
of the EU, as Cornwall’s GDP per capita was €9,900 in 1995, equal to 58.2% of 
the EU15, and €11,800 in 1999, corresponding to 57.6% of the EU15. 
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Figure 1  
GDP PPS per inhabitant (EUR), 1995-2009 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with OECD data. 
Despite Cornwall’s GDP per capita was way below the 75% threshold in the 
90s, the European Commission entitled Cornwall to receive Objective 1 funding 
only from the programming period starting in 2000. The reason for this is that 
until 1998 Cornwall and its neighbour Devon were incorporated into a single 
statistical area with a GDP per capita above 75% of the EU. In 1998 the UK 
Government introduced a reform revising NUTS regional borders, splitting the 
Cornwall-Devon region into two separate statistical areas. Previously, under 
the ‘Devonwall’ political concept promoted by the UK Conservative Party from 
the 1970s, Cornwall and Devon had been linked together in an economic, 
political and statistical sense. 
After the 1997 UK general elections and the defeat of the Conservatives, the 
Liberal Democrats withdrew their support to the ‘Devonwall’ project, opening 
the doors to the statistical separation of the two regions and the possibility for 
Cornwall to be awarded Objective 1 status. Despite the existence of a political 
campaign for Cornwall’s separation from Devon, the change in regional 
borders and in EU funds eligibility was hardly predictable (Willett, 2013). The 
requests of separation were complicated by the presence of political elites and 
EU Objective 1 funds in Britain and the prospect of Brexit 
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stakeholders in Cornwall believing that the unity between Devon and Cornwall 
was best serving their interests, due to the possibility of having a stronger 
‘lobbying voice’ by staying together (Stanyer, 1997). In addition, the Labour 
party winning the 1997 national elections was not particularly keen on 
devolving political autonomy to territories it did not control politically8 (Willet 
and Giovannini, 2014). 
Importantly, the reasons behind the attainment of the Objective 1 status in 
Cornwall are independent from any circumstance directly affecting the long-
term economic trajectory of the region. The 1998 reform justified the division 
of Devon and Cornwall on the basis of “the very different economic conditions 
of the two counties, and Cornwall’s sparsity of population, geographical 
peripherality and distinct cultural and historic factors reflecting a Celtic 
background” (House of Common, 1998). The economic differences between 
Cornwall and Devon emphasised by the UK Government are evident if the 
levels of per capita GDP of the two regions are compared.9 However, when 
looking at other measures of economic prosperity such as the Total Household 
Income or the Gross Disposable Household Income10, the figures for 1997-1999 
appear very similar for the two regions and in both cases above the 75% EU 
threshold (Gripaios and McVittie, 2003). This suggests that Cornwall was 
“somewhat fortunate to be awarded Objective 1 status” (Gripaios and McVittie, 
                                                 
 
8 In the 1997 elections the Labour party obtained the relative majority of votes only in one of five 
Cornish constituencies (the other four were won by the Liberal Democrats), while in the 1992 
elections the Labour was the third party after Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The 1998 
reform was promoted by the Labour-led central government. Given the historical political 
weakness of the Labour in Cornwall, the Devon-Cornwall 1998 separation was not easily 
foreseeable, due to the fact that it would have meant a political victory for an opposition party, the 
Lib Dem, which had begun to back the separatists’ requests. The separation has been the result of 
lobbying activities which eventually led the national government to include the Cornwall-Devon 
division in the reform (Willet, 2013). 
9 In 1999, the per capita GDP of Cornwall was €11,800, while Devon’s was around €15,900.   
10 Total Household Income (THI) is calculated as all income received by household residents in a 
region, while Gross Disposable Household Income deducts from THI expenditures on taxes, social 
security, pension contributions and interest payments.   
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2003: 372), as the principal reason for the region’s qualification for financial 
support was the way borders have been re-drawn (Gripaios and McVittie, 2003; 
Gripaios and Bishop, 2006).  
Therefore, the sudden increase in EU grants can be considered exogenous to 
the pre-treatment economic trend of the region, making it possible to identify 
the effect of EU-financed programmes by looking at the evolution of the 
regional labour market before and after the attainment of the Objective 1 status. 
The Objective 1 status of Cornwall was confirmed in 2006 for the 2007-2013 
period, and again in 2013 for the 2014-2020 period (Appendix A1). This makes 
Cornwall the region that received the largest proportions of EU funds per 
capita in England from 2000 onwards (Table 1). And yet, this did not prevent 
the Cornish population to vote in majority for leaving the EU at the 2016 Brexit 
referendum. The outcome reflects a progressive increase of anti-EU feelings 
among Cornwall’s citizens over the last twenty years.11 
South Yorkshire. With respect to Cornwall, the attainment of Objective 1 
eligibility in South Yorkshire has occurred in a ‘less unexpected’ way. Formerly 
specialised in manufacturing, South Yorkshire has gone through a period of 
deindustrialisation which brought to the closure of most coal mines in the early 
1990s. The region’s economic decline was seriously addressed by the central 
Government only from 1997 onwards, when the newly-elected Labour 
Government promoted interventions tackling the growing unemployment by 
matching national resources with the EU funds (Kirk et al., 2012). From 1994 to 
1999, the South Yorkshire territory was classified as Objective 2. The proportion 
                                                 
 
11 According to a 1997 survey, when asked whether Britain should unite with the EU or protect its 
independence , 37% of respondents were hoping for more independence (6-10 on a scale 0-10, 
with 0 corresponding to full European integration and 10 to full independence) rather than more 
integration, 46% were hoping for more integration (0-4) (Heath et al., 1999). In 2015, these 
percentages had drastically changed. 49% were in favour of more independence, 28% supporting 
more integration (Fieldhouse et al., 2016). 
EU Objective 1 funds in Britain and the prospect of Brexit 
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of EU funds available to the region increased massively from 2000, when South 
Yorkshire became eligible for Objective 1 support. 
Unlike the Cornwall case, there has been no border re-definition behind the 
change of status of the region. Hence, anticipation effects and externalities may 
affect our estimates if we assume that people and firms react to the change in 
eligibility before this has actually occurred. However, the fact that South 
Yorkshire’s per capita GDP was swinging above and below the 75% threshold 
just before 2000 – it was 74.2% of the EU15 in 1997 and 76% in 199812 – made it 
more difficult to predict a future Objective 1 eligibility, and therefore behave in 
such a way that could anticipate the inflow of EU funds to the region. 
Moreover, the per capita GDP trend of the region has been almost parallel to 
the one of the EU15 in the years preceding the eligibility change (Figure 1). 
South Yorkshire’s growth rate during the 1995-1999 period was 5.9%, slightly 
above the EU15’s 4.8%. The region continued catching up with the EU average 
during 2000-2006 period and due to this increase in income and to the Eastern 
Enlargement – an exogenous event which made the 75% threshold easier to be 
exceeded– during the 2007-2013 period South Yorkshire lost the status of 
Objective 1 becoming a Phasing-in region. 
The Phasing-in status entitled South Yorkshire to receive ‘transitional funding’, 
that is, more resources than any other non-Objective 1 region but less than 
Cornwall, the only English Objective 1 region during the programming period 
starting in 2007 (Table 1). This status was confirmed in 2013, when South 
Yorkshire was defined as a ‘Transition region’ for the 2014-2020 period, i.e. with 
                                                 
 
12 The region was entitled to receive Objective 1 funds despite the fact that its GDP was above 75% 
of EU average in 1998 because the EU considers the average GDP of the three years of available 
data before the beginning of the period to classify the regions. Final data for 1998 was presumably 
not yet available in 1999, when the final decision over eligibility was made.   
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an average GDP per capita between 75% and 90% of the EU average. This gives 
the possibility to obtain more funds than ‘more developed regions’ (GDP per 
capita above 90% of the EU average), but less than ‘less developed regions’ 
(former Objective 1). 
Hence, starting from 2000 South Yorkshire has absorbed large shares of EU 
funds. This has allowed to promote a vast number of development projects 
across the region. Nonetheless, this flow of funds has not managed to change 
the attitudes of the population regarding the EU and the process of European 
integration. The EU was seen with scepticism in South Yorkshire before 2000, 
and the period of intense funding has not mitigated these feelings.13 This has 
led to an overwhelming request to leave the EU at the 2016 Brexit referendum 
– 61% of the total voters in the region. 
Potentially confounding policies. The main policy for employment promotion 
in Cornwall and South Yorkshire besides EU Cohesion Policy was the Regional 
Selective Assistance (RSA) programme (renamed in 2008 as Grant for Business 
Investment (GBI)), financed by the UK national Government and intended to 
‘create and safeguard’ employment in the poorest areas of the country 
(Criscuolo et al., 2012). The RSA schemes are no longer in force in England since 
2014.  
Through this policy, the Government provided grants to manufacturing firms 
located in UK areas characterised by low GDP per capita and high 
unemployment. Changes in eligibility for RSA occurred in coincidence with the 
start of new EU programming periods. We attempt to minimise the potentially 
                                                 
 
13 A 1997 survey on attitudes towards the EU shows that in South Yorkshire 38% of respondents 
were hoping for more independence rather than more European integration (6-10 on a scale 0-
10), of which 22% thought the UK should ‘Do all it can to protect independence’ from the EU (10); 
31% were hoping for more integration (0-4) (Heath et al., 1999). In 2015, 48% were hoping the 
country would become more independent from the EU, while 31% were hoping for more 
integration (Fieldhouse et al., 2016).   
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confounding effect of this policy in the empirical analysis, by exploiting 
variations over time in the geography of RSA support schemes. 
 
4. Data and descriptives 
The main outcome variable used to evaluate the effectiveness of Objective 1 
funding in Cornwall and South Yorkshire is unemployment, proxied by the 
share of people claiming Job-Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) unemployment 
benefits. 14  Data are obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Nomis database and are available from the year 1992. Although the share of 
unemployment benefit claimants is not an official measure of unemployment, 
it is a less noisy indicator than the unemployment rate15  and the only one 
available for areas smaller than UK Local Authorities. As shown in Appendix 
A2, during the period in which Cornwall and South Yorkshire have received 
Objective 1 funds, the rate of UK unemployment benefit claimants and the 
unemployment rate display similar trajectories. Figure A2 shows that from 
2000 the dynamics of unemployment in the UK have followed upward and 
downward trends. The unemployment rate was 5.5% in 2000, peaked at 8% 
during the crisis and declined to 6.2% in 2014. 
A second outcome variable used in the analysis is per capita GDP, available 
only at the regional level from 1995 onwards. Information on this variable is 
obtained from OECD statistics. 
                                                 
 
14  Job-Seeker Allowance unemployment benefit is paid by the UK national government to 
unemployed people who are actively seeking work. All citizens of England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland are equally entitled to apply for JSA.   
15 The JSA claimant count is often used as a proxy for unemployment. Due to sampling variability, 
the estimates of unemployment produced by the Labour Force Survey (LFS) are highly volatile. For 
this reason, JSA benefit claimant count is a less distorted and more reliable indicator than the 
unemployment rate, particularly when focusing on subsets of the UK population and on small 
administrative areas (ONS, 2013).   
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Figure 2 describes the level and growth of unemployment and per capita GDP 
of English NUTS2 regions during the analysed period. The upper quadrants of 
the Figure show the percentage of unemployment benefit claimants and the 
level of income before 2000. Cornwall and South Yorkshire were among the 
regions with the highest percentage of unemployed people, and among the 
poorest regions in the country. The bottom quadrants of Figure 2 suggest that 
during the 2000-2013 period Cornwall has been one of the top performing 
regions in England both in terms of unemployment reduction – a decrease by 
over 3% – and in terms of economic growth – an increase by over 2.8%. 
Conversely, the performance of South Yorkshire during the same period has 
been in line with the England average. The variation of unemployment and per 
capita GDP has been similar to the one of most English regions. South 
Yorkshire experienced one of the largest unemployment reductions and fastest 
GDP pc growth during the 2000-2006 period; however, the following years 
have been characterised by growing unemployment – over 9% increase – and 
an economic recession – over 1.2% reduction in GDP per capita. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Objective 1 funds in Britain and the prospect of Brexit 
18 
 
Figure 2 
Unemployment benefit claimants and GDP per capita levels and growth, English regions 
  
Source: own elaboration with Nomis and OECD data. 
We analyse these trends more thoroughly in the empirical analysis. 
Two different spatial dimensions are used for the counterfactual study: regions 
and wards. 
Regions. The analysis performed at the regional level exploits two main 
sources of data. The first is Eurostat Regio, providing data from 1995 until 2014; 
the second is the Quarterly Labour Force Survey Local Area Data (LFS LAD), 
  Marco Di Cataldo 
  
19 
 
containing information on employment, economic activity and related subjects 
at the level of UK Local Authority Districts from 1992 to 2006. The period is 
collapsed from quarterly to yearly. The final dataset is composed of LFS 
variables from 1992 to 2006, Eurostat and OECD variables from 1995 to 2014 
and the unemployment proxy available from 1992 to 2014. 
NUTS2 regions are characterised by an average population of 1.7 million 
inhabitants, of which 2.8% claiming unemployment benefits (2000-2014 
average). 
Wards. The lowest level of aggregation used in this study is the one of electoral 
wards. Ward-level units allow to capture localised unemployment clusters, 
because most ward boundaries have been used by the ONS in 2001 to draw 
Output Areas (for which data is not available), a geographical classification of 
socially homogeneous areas in terms of household tenure and population size. 
The wards of England have an average population of around 5000 inhabitants 
(with high variance across wards, see descriptive table in Appendix A3). 
Due to the 1996 revision of frozen ward boundaries, the unemployment 
variable is only available for wards from 1996. Data on other variables at ward 
level is obtained from the 1991 UK Census. The following Censuses cannot be 
used because they relate to different ward classifications. The variable for 
wards’ residents is given by the number of 1991 residents interpolated between 
1996 and 2014 by assigning the average population growth rate of the region to 
its constituent wards. 
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5. Results 
5.1  Regional level analysis 
Synthetic control method – main results. In order to compare the 
unemployment trend of the treated regions with appropriate counterfactuals, 
we adopt the synthetic control method for comparative case studies developed 
by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010; 2015) (see Annex for 
an explanation of this methodology). The synthetic control units are 
constructed on the basis of a number of labour market indicators related to the 
typology of the labour force, the sectorial composition and the level of 
education and training. In addition, we control for the level of GDP per capita.16 
We also account for the fact that Cornwall and South Yorkshire were receiving 
EU funds during 1994-1999 by controlling for the amount of Structural Funds 
obtained in the pre-treatment period. 
Table A4 in the Appendix summarises pre-treatment average values of all 
variables used to construct the synthetic region, comparing them to the 
averages for Cornwall, South Yorkshire and England. Table A5 presents the list 
of ‘weights’ used to obtain the synthetic regions. In the case of Cornwall, Devon 
provides almost 60% of the weights, not surprisingly given the strong 
connection with the Cornish economy discussed above. The remaining weights 
are from regions being among the highest recipients of Structural Funds during 
1994-1999. In the case of South Yorkshire, the main weights come from Tees 
Valley and East Yorkshire, also obtaining high shares of EU funds before 2000. 
In both cases, the synthetic regions have an average value of per capita 
                                                 
 
16 By construction, Cornwall and South Yorkshire are the regions with the lowest per capita GDP 
among all regions in the sample (Merseyside is excluded), making it impossible for the synthetic 
region to perfectly match the treated region on this characteristic. Nonetheless, including this 
control is important in order to minimise convergence effects not being determined by Structural 
Funds support.   
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Structural Funds in the pre-treatment period that is above the English average 
and close to the figure of the two treated regions. 
Figure 3 plots the unemployment trend for Cornwall and South Yorkshire with 
the estimated trend of the respective synthetic regions between 1992 and 2014. 
The pre-treatment indicators predict well the evolution of unemployment 
trajectories of the treated regions until 1999, suggesting that treatment and 
control regions are running in parallel before the start of the treatment. 
Panel A of Figure 3 reports the evolution of unemployment in Cornwall and its 
synthetic counterpart. From 2000 onwards a gap is clearly visible, indicating 
that Cornwall reduced its unemployment more than the synthetic control 
during the 2000-2006 and the 2007-2013 programming periods. South Yorkshire 
and synthetic control are displayed in panel B of Figure 3. In this case, the two 
unemployment trends diverge marginally in 1999. Nevertheless, the largest 
gap between the two lines is visible during the period in which South Yorkshire 
was entitled to receive Objective 1 funds, i.e. 2000-2006. South Yorkshire’s 
lower line suggests that the region has reduced the proportion of unemployed 
people more than a region similar in all relevant characteristics except for not 
having received Objective 1 aid. South Yorkshire’s gap with the synthetic 
region tends to reduce over time. From the year 2008, treated and control 
regions report increasingly similar levels of unemployment, up to the point that 
the two lines overlap again in 2013-2014. This suggests that when South 
Yorkshire was classified as Phasing-in, unemployment has grown faster than 
in the synthetic region, completely offsetting all labour market improvements 
of the previous seven years. 
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Figure 3  
Unemployment trends 1992-2014: treated vs. synthetic regions 
Panel A: Cornwall      Panel B: South Yorkshire 
Source: own elaboration with Nomis data. 
In order to test for the significance of the estimated effects we follow Abadie et 
al. (2010) and run a series of placebo studies by iteratively applying the 
synthetic control method to every other untreated English region. We shift 
Cornwall and South Yorkshire among the control units and reassign the 
treatment to each one of the regions in the sample. We then compute the gap 
between the two trends for all iterations and compare it to the one estimated 
for the two treatment regions. The results of the placebo test are displayed in 
Figure 4.  
Panel A provides clear evidence of a significant effect for Cornwall. No other 
region in the sample has witnessed a reduction in unemployment as large as 
the one experienced by Cornwall. A difference in the gap between Cornwall 
and every other English region is visible from 2002 and increases over time, 
until it stabilises in 2009. This suggests that throughout the Objective 1 period 
Cornwall has reduced the proportion of unemployment benefit claimants more 
than regions not eligible for Objective 1 grants. The difference between 
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Cornwall’s and the synthetic region’s unemployment changes is equal to 0.93 
percentage points17, corresponding to a percentage of unemployment benefit 
claimants approximately 30% lower than the control region.  
Figure 4  
Unemployment gap in treated regions and placebo gaps 
         Panel A: Cornwall      Panel B: South Yorkshire
           
 
Panel B of Figure 4 tests the significance of the estimated gap for South 
Yorkshire. Between 2001 and 2005, South Yorkshire’s proportion of 
unemployment benefit claimants was lower than any other English region not 
eligible for Objective 1 policies, indicating a statistically significant difference 
between treatment and control during the period. However, during the 
following years the gap becomes progressively closer to zero. This means that 
South Yorkshire was capable of reducing unemployment more than regions not 
in receipt of Objective 1 funds, but only temporarily. In the long-run, we do not 
find any significant effect on the unemployment trend of the region.  
                                                 
 
17 This has been calculated as: (U Cornwall 2013 – U Cornwall 1999) – (U synthetic 2013 – U synthetic 1999) = (1.74 - 
2.88) - (2.69 - 2.89) = -0.93. 
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Robustness tests. One concern with these estimates is the presence of 
externalities potentially confounding the selection of untreated areas. The 
regions neighbouring Cornwall and South Yorkshire might have benefitted 
from the improved economic and labour market conditions of Objective 1 
regions, or they might have lost out key assets (in the form of human capital 
and firms) due to the attractiveness of EU projects. In an attempt to minimise 
spillover effects, the main estimations are replicated by excluding from the 
donor pool of the synthetic controls all regions sharing a border with Cornwall 
or South Yorkshire. 
In the case of Cornwall, the strong proximity between the Cornish and the 
Devon economy makes Devon as the region most likely to be affected by 
treatment externalities. Similarly, all regions neighbouring South Yorkshire 
(North Yorkshire, East Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Derbyshire 
and Nottinghamshire) may be conditioned by the fact that the region was 
awarded Objective 1 funds. The results of the ‘leave-neighbours-out’ exercises 
are reported in Appendix A6 alongside synthetic controls’ weights. Spillovers 
do not seem to be a major factor in this context as the results of these estimations 
are not significantly different from the ones presented in Figure 3.18 
As a second test to assess the credibility of the main synthetic control estimates, 
we artificially anticipate the start of the Objective 1 period. If, as we argue, the 
reduction in unemployment is driven by EU funds, then by anticipating the 
treatment we should find no significant difference in unemployment before 
2000. 
                                                 
 
18 This way of controlling for externalities is imperfect. However, in absence of data on migration 
and mobility of firms across regions, it is the best possible way to control for the relocation of 
economic activity towards the treated regions.   
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This placebo study is performed by using 1992-1996 values of the control 
variables to construct the synthetic regions, and allow for treatment effects to 
materialise in 1997. The results of the test are displayed in Appendix A7. As 
shown in the two figures, there is no evidence of a significant divergence of 
unemployment trends between treated and synthetic regions before 2000. This 
is reassuring regarding the existence of any anticipation effect. The estimated 
effect during Objective 1 years seems to have little to do with labour market 
and economic changes occurring in expectation of future Objective 1 eligibility. 
Effect on per capita GDP. The main intention of Cohesion Policy is to foster 
the economic development of European territories. The effectiveness of EU 
regional policies is generally evaluated by looking at the impact they produce 
on the economic growth rate of targeted regions. For this reason, we extend our 
empirical analysis by considering per capita GDP as an alternative outcome 
variable. 
In order to replicate the synthetic control analysis, we adopt a number of 
variables referring to key factors generally identified as growth determinants 
in the literature. The level of private capital investment, the stock of 
infrastructure, and the degree of technological development and innovation – 
regarded as key drivers on long-run economic growth (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1996; 
OECD, 2009) – are proxied by the percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 
the number of kilometres of roads per regional area, the share of human 
resources in science and technology and the number of patent applications per 
thousand inhabitants, respectively. These variables are used to predict the 
synthetic control regions’ pre-treatment trends of GDP per capita. 
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Figure 5  
Per capita GDP trends 1995-2014: treated vs. synthetic regions 
Panel A: Cornwall              Panel B: South Yorkshire  
  
   
Source: own elaboration with OECD data. 
 
 
Given that Cornwall and South Yorkshire are the regions in the sample with 
the lowest income per inhabitant, by definition the pre-treatment GDP per 
capita levels of treated units cannot be replicated by the synthetic controls. This 
implies that the trends of treated and counterfactual regions are not 
overlapping in the pre-treatment period. However, as shown in Figure 5, both 
Cornwall and South Yorkshire’s trajectories run in parallel with the ones of 
their relative synthetic counterparts before 2000, indicating that the growth rate 
of treatment and synthetic units is similar prior to the beginning of the 
Objective 1 period. 
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The results of the empirical test indicate that Cornwall has partially closed the 
income gap with the synthetic control region. The bottom-left quadrant of 
Figure 5 illustrates that the distance between Cornwall and control region is 
progressively reducing over time. The fastest catch-up of Cornwall is visible 
during the first treatment years. 
South Yorkshire has grown faster than the synthetic region over the analysed 
period. The top-right quadrant of Figure 5 indicates that the treated region has 
experienced high growth rates while receiving Objective 1 funds, overcoming 
the control region in terms of GDP per capita in 2005. This tendency is 
interrupted and reverted from 2008, when South Yorkshire’s worse growth 
performance widens the income gap between the two regions (bottom-right 
quadrant, Figure 5). 
These results should be taken with caution, due to the imperfect method of 
calculating the synthetic controls, and to the relatively short number of pre-
treatment years. Having taken these caveats into consideration, the findings are 
generally in line with the ones obtained using unemployment as outcome 
variable. Objective 1 funds seem to be effective in both regions, but South 
Yorkshire’s conditions are progressively deteriorated when the region loses the 
Objective 1 status. 
 
5.2  Ward-level analysis 
Difference-in-differences. We test the robustness of the results obtained with 
the synthetic control method and unemployment as dependent variable using 
data at the level of wards. By taking the 134 wards of Cornwall and the 94 
wards of South Yorkshire as treatment units, we estimate their mean 
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unemployment growth during periods of highest EU financial support with a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) model. 
For each of the two Objective 1 regions, the comparison groups are obtained 
from the 8,269 wards of all English regions not eligible for Objective 1 funds. 
Rather than comparing the 134 and 94 treated wards to all 8,269 wards from 
untreated regions, we limit the analysis to the wards in the control group which 
are most comparable in terms of their observable characteristics. In order to 
identify the most similar control wards to the treated wards, we resort to the 
propensity score matching (PSM) method. The psmatch2 estimator (Leuven and 
Sianesi, 2003) is used to match wards from either Cornwall or South Yorkshire 
one-to-one without replacement with a set of untreated wards, using the 
nearest neighbour algorithm. The matching is based on a number of key socio-
economic characteristics from the 1991 Census and on pre-treatment 
unemployment.19 In such a way, we obtain a set of control wards whose ex ante 
probability of receiving treatment – as predicted by pre-treatment variables – 
is sufficiently similar to the one of treated units (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Table A8 in the Appendix reports the covariates’ balancing tests for wards of 
Cornwall and South Yorkshire. There is no statistical difference between 
treated and control wards for all observable socio-economic characteristics, 
suggesting that the PSM has produced suitable control groups. 
                                                 
 
19 Given that almost all covariates are taken from the 1991 Census, they have no time variation. 
Therefore, the PSM has been performed with a collapsed (cross-section) dataset for the pre-
treatment period. The selection of control groups has been done by matching one-to-one treatment 
wards with untreated wards on the basis of 1991 covariates and wards’ unemployment averaged 
between 1996 and 1999. For each treated ward, our matching algorithm finds a control unit with 
similar characteristics. The selection of wards as controls from the cross-section dataset has been 
used to compute DiD estimates. Hence, the sample of wards used for DiD estimates is made of 
treated wards (Cornwall or South Yorkshire) and matched wards.   
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The DiD analysis is performed with panel data from 1996 to 2014. We estimate 
different versions of the following model: 
 !"#$%&' ,! = "#$%&1#'()*+-# . /#0$%&1#'()*+-# × 2('*+3#!4 . 5#! . 6# ,! 
where 7)'+89: *,9 is the annual growth rate of unemployment benefit claimants 
in ward i at year t; $%&1 '()*+- * is a dummy taking value one for wards 
belonging to treated regions (either Cornwall of South Yorkshire) and zero 
otherwise; 2('*+3 9 is a dummy referring to the post-2000 period of reference 
(either the full period, 2000-2014, or one of the two sub-periods, 2000-2006 and 
2007-2014); 5 9 are a full set of year dummies; and 6 *,9 is an idiosyncratic error 
term. Given that eligibility for EU funds is assigned at the regional (NUTS2) 
level, standard errors are clustered at this level throughout the analysis. Our 
DiD specification, similar to Redding and Sturm (2008), allows for unobserved 
fixed effects in wards, which are differenced out as we compute unemployment 
growth rates. The coefficient of interest of the model, /, compares the 
unemployment growth of treated wards with the one of respective groups of 
untreated wards, selected through PSM. 
The results of the DiD model are presented in Table 2. 
We begin the discussion of results with the estimates for Cornwall in columns 
(1) to (6). First, it can be seen that the dummy variable for Cornwall wards is 
insignificant in all different specifications, indicating no difference in 
unemployment growth between Cornwall and matched wards prior to 2000. 
Hence, the propensity score matching has produced comparable treatment and 
control groups on the basis of pre-treatment labour market conditions. 
The interaction term between Cornwall wards and the 2('*+3 9 dummy refers 
to the difference in unemployment growth between treated and control wards 
during Objective 1 periods. According to our results, unemployment in 
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Cornwall wards decreased 3.8 percentage points faster than in control wards. 
This is a larger difference with respect to the one obtained from synthetic 
control estimates. The estimated gap between Cornwall and the synthetic 
control region corresponds to an annual average difference in unemployment 
growth of 2.5 percentage points. The discrepancy between the two results is 
probably due to the fact that the pre-treatment matching in the ward-level 
analysis is performed on a lower number of covariates (for example, data on 
Structural Funds’ shares are not available at the ward level) and on a shorter 
time-span. For these reasons, we find more reliable the regional-level point 
estimates. 
Column (3) shows that the difference in the rate of decrease of unemployment 
was higher during the first EU programming period, while in the second 
Objective 1 period it reduced in magnitude but remained marginally significant 
(column (5)). These trends are in line with the results of the synthetic control 
method, reporting a gap between treated and synthetic region developing 
mainly during the 2000-2006 period. 
As discussed in section III, other policy initiatives for the promotion of 
employment were implemented in Cornwall in coincidence with the Objective 
1 programme. In particular, the main Government policy aiming at the creation 
of new jobs was the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). Before 2000, the large 
majority of Cornwall’s territory was already considered eligible under RSA 
support schemes, but 48 wards of Cornwall became eligible to receive RSA 
transfers in 2000. Hence, one way to partially test whether RSA policies are 
confounding our estimates is to verify whether the results are sensitive to the 
exclusion of these wards. Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 2 report the estimate 
results of the model excluding the 48 wards eligible for RSA from 2000. As 
compared to full sample estimates, the coefficients are virtually unchanged. 
Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that Cornwall’s change in 
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unemployment can be ascribed to the success of employment-promoting 
programmes funded by Structural Funds rather than to RSA policies. 
The results of the model for South Yorkshire are displayed in the three final 
columns of Table 2. In all specifications, the growth rate of unemployment of 
South Yorkshire wards is not significantly different from the one of control 
wards before 2000, again suggesting that the PSM based on pre-treatment 
covariates has allowed to create comparable treatment and control groups. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between treated wards and treatment 
periods in column (7) reports the difference in unemployment growth between 
South Yorkshire and control wards. The unemployment growth rate of South 
Yorkshire is not statistically different from the one of comparable wards. This 
confirms the synthetic control results in that EU policies seem to have produced 
no effect in the region over the 2000-2014 period. 
When the full period is sub-divided into two sub-periods, the results are again 
in line with those obtained with regional-level data. The negative and 
significant coefficient of the interaction term in column (8) shows that for 2000-
2006 the unemployment reduction in South Yorkshire is significantly higher 
than in control wards. Conversely, for 2007-2014 the coefficient comparing the 
unemployment growth rate of South Yorkshire wards to untreated areas of 
England is positive (albeit insignificant), suggesting that unemployment has 
increased relative to control wards (column (9)).
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6. Regional investment strategies  
According to our findings, Cornwall and South Yorkshire have reduced 
unemployment significantly more than other areas in England during 
Objective 1 periods. In this section, we relate this outcome to the policies 
financed through EU Structural Funds and promoting employment, skills, 
social inclusion, and other key educational and labour market goals in these 
two regions. Data from the European Commission allows to reconstruct the 
development strategies of Cornwall and South Yorkshire and the proportion of 
allocated funds during 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. In such a way, it is possible to 
observe how Objective 1 and Phasing-in programmes have been designed prior 
to their implementation.  
The statistics on the proportion of EU funds committed by the European 
Commission are displayed in Table A9 in the Appendix. The total amounts of 
funds per capita are sub-divided by different fields of intervention. It can be 
noted that both Cornwall and South Yorkshire’s 2000-2006 Objective 1 
programmes have allocated a great deal of resources to direct measures for 
employment promotion and training – mainly through the European Social 
Fund (ESF) – in the following thematic areas: ‘workforce flexibility & 
entrepreneurial activity’, ‘social inclusion’, ‘labour market policy and labour 
market actions for women’, and ‘educational and vocational training’. 20 
Cornwall had planned to spend up to €28.7 per person every year during 2000-
2006 in these themes, while South Yorkshire had earmarked up to €37.7 per 
inhabitant. Most of these interventions were financed by the European Social 
                                                 
 
20  These initiatives were included within the strategic goal ‘Developing people’ of the Single 
Programming Document (SPD) for Cornwall (South West Observatory Skills and Learning, 2008), 
and the priority theme ‘Building a learning region which promotes equity, employment and social 
inclusion’ of the SPD for South Yorkshire (Government Office for Yorkshire and The Humber, 
2008).  
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Fund (ESF). The total 2000-2006 allocations from the ESF 21  amounted to 
approximately 20% (Cornwall) and 29% (South Yorkshire) of the total 
committed EU funds. 
ESF-financed policies were not the only measures potentially contributing to 
reduce the number of people claiming unemployment benefits in the two 
regions. Projects focusing on development goals related to infrastructure, R&D 
and innovation, human capital, business development, and other investment 
areas, may have also produced significant employment boosts. Most 
interventions in these fields were mainly intended for the promotion of 
regional economic growth, and are likely to have contributed to the economic 
catch-up observed during 2000-2006. 
The main difference between the strategies of the two regions is that South 
Yorkshire concentrated large shares of funds on two themes, ‘Planning & 
rehabilitation’ and ‘SMEs and the craft sector’, while Cornwall has distributed 
funds more equally across different fields of intervention. 
If we look at the 2007-2013 programming period, the total funds to South 
Yorkshire’s operational programme decreased by almost 70%. This reduction 
involved all investment pillars, including the proportion of resources directly 
promoting employment – calculated as the sum of ‘lifelong learning, training, 
entrepreneurship’, ‘services for employment and training’, ‘social inclusion’, 
and ‘access to employment and sustainability’ – which went down to €20.2 per 
person, i.e. almost halved with respect to the previous period. In contrast, 
Cornwall’s effort to create new jobs and reduce labour market exclusion 
increased to €55 per person annually, 35% of the total committed funds. Yet, 
                                                 
 
21 The total ESF allocations for 2000-2006 were €101m for Cornwall (total EU funds in the region: 
€520m), and €365m for South Yorkshire (total EU funds in the region: €1,212m).   
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this investment was only partially successful given that, as shown by our 
results, the rate of unemployment reduction during 2007-2013 was lower with 
respect to 2000-2006.22 
 
7. Conclusions 
The exit of the UK from the European Union will leave poorer UK regions 
without access to EU Structural Funds. In this paper we have looked at two 
regions that voted to leave the EU at the Brexit referendum, despite having 
benefitted from EU Cohesion Policy for many years. We have tested whether 
the most significant form of EU economic support – the Objective 1 programme 
– has been successful, and the extent to which a reduction of EU subsidies may 
affect the development trajectories of UK regions. Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire have been compared to synthetic control regions similar to them but 
not eligible for Objective 1 policies.  
Our results indicate that Cornwall has made good use of Objective 1 funds. EU 
development policies have helped to lower the proportion of people claiming 
unemployment benefits and reduce the income gap with richer regions. South 
Yorkshire received Objective 1 funds for one single programming period, 
during which some significant improvements were visible. As compared to 
regions not eligible for Objective 1 support, South Yorkshire has grown faster 
and has seen unemployment diminish. However, these gains have not led to a 
different and self-sustainable development path. During the following period 
                                                 
 
22  The calculation of investment shares was obtained from commitment data. As such, they 
correspond to potential disbursement of funds, planned in accordance with the European 
Commission before the beginning of the programming periods. Hence, the shares of investments 
in Table A9 might not reflect the finances actually received and spent by the regions. 
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the region displayed one of the worst performances among English regions, 
despite being still subsidised by the EU as part of the Phasing-in programme.  
These findings should foster a careful reflection over the future of poorer UK 
regions in the event of an imminent exit of the country from the EU. Losing the 
possibility to access EU Structural Funds is likely to expose the economy of less 
developed UK regions to potential adverse effects. A region like Cornwall, 
which has benefitted from Objective 1 policies for a long period of time, faces 
the highest risks. In this sense, the experience of South Yorkshire may represent 
a valuable lesson; losing Objective 1 funds can produce a short-term shock, and 
the labour market and economy can continue struggling in the medium-term. 
Cornwall is not necessarily bound to follow the same destiny as South 
Yorkshire as the two regions differ in many respects, including the investment 
strategies adopted during Objective 1 periods. These differences, however, may 
not be sufficient for Cornwall to take a different post-policy development path. 
Unlike EU regions shifting from a status of ‘Objective 1’ to ‘Phasing-out’ or 
‘Phasing-in’, Cornwall will not have the possibility of obtaining EU transitional 
funding. Hence, the loss of EU subsidies may be more likely to produce 
negative consequences on its economy if the national Government does not put 
in place any compensatory policy supporting its transition in funding 
environment. These potential repercussions apply not only to Cornwall but 
also to all economically disadvantaged UK regions dependent on EU aid, such 
as West Wales and The Valleys, the only other UK Objective 1 region at the 
moment of the Brexit vote. 
More generally, the results of our analysis contribute to the current debate on 
the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy. The Cornwall case has shown that 
Objective 1 funding may be successful, even in a causal sense. However, the 
effects produced by these policies may not be long-lasting, rather they may 
disappear when the funding period has ended. Hence, when designing and 
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implementing development projects, EU Objective 1 regions should think 
carefully of what the legacy of the interventions will be. EU funds should be 
used to prepare the less advantaged territories for the moment when, 
inevitably, the resources will be cut down. Not doing so may imply that any 
improvement obtained during the Objective 1 period will vanish in the long 
term. 
Our study is the first in the literature to empirically study the impact of a 
sudden increase and decrease in the availability of Structural Funds on the 
performance of less developed regions. The results of the analysis should be 
taken with caution, mostly because our investigation is based on two specific 
contexts. An important task for future contributions is to test the validity of our 
findings in other regions, assessing whether they evolve in similar ways as in 
the two case-studies analysed in this paper. In addition, the data at our disposal 
do not allow us to provide clear answers regarding the key mechanisms 
producing the effects we observe. Future research may attempt to identify the 
factors conditioning the long-term impacts of EU policies using different 
identification strategies.  
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Annex 
Synthetic Control Method  
 
The Synthetic Control Method for comparative case studies (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010; 2015) allows to assess the effect of policy 
interventions taking place at an aggregate level, using data for geographical 
units not exposed to the treatment but comparable to the treated region. The 
sample is made of   + 1 units, with   = 1 being the case of interest and   = 2 to   = 
! + 1 being potential comparisons. To construct the synthetic control we 
consider all English regions not receiving Objective 1 support during 2000-
2006, using data from pre-intervention ("#) and post-intervention ("$) years. 
The control unit is obtained from a (! × 1) vector % = (&2,… , &!+1)′ made of 
nonnegative weights all summing up to one. Each value of % represents a 
weighted average of values obtained from control regions, that is, a potential 
synthetic control. Let '$ be a (( × 1) vector of pre-treatment characteristics that 
can be used as predictors of labour market outcomes, and ) a (( × () diagonal 
matrix whose values indicate the relative importance of each predictor. We 
look for a vector %* that minimises ('$ − '#%)′)('$ − '#%), subject to &  ≥ 0 (  
= 2, … , !) and &2 + * + &!+1 = 1. ) is chosen such that the treated regions’ 
trajectory in the pre-treatment period is best reproduced by the synthetic 
region.  
Let + , be the outcome of unit   at time ,, -$ a (.1 × 1) vector collecting post-
intervention values of the outcome variable and -# a (.1 × !) matrix containing 
post-intervention values of the outcome for the control unit. The synthetic 
control estimator of the treatment effect on the treated region is given by the 
comparison of the different outcomes of the two units from the beginning of 
the Objective 1 programme until the end of the period. The synthetic control 
estimator is obtained as: -$, – / &0
1+02
345
067 . 
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Appendix 
 
A1  Objective 1 eligibility maps in the UK, 1994-1999, 2000-2006, 2007-2013, and 2014-2020 
 
1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 2014-2020 
    
 
Note: shaded areas are Objective 1 regions  
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A2  UK rates of unemployment and unemployment benefit claimants, 2000-2014 
 
Source: Nomis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
4
6
8
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
unemployment rate unemployment benefit claimant rate
EU Objective 1 funds in Britain and the prospect of Brexit 
44 
 
A3  Descriptive statistics – wards 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Ward residents in 1991  8519 5267 3779 
Unemployment (1996-2014)  161,240 1.871 1.555 
Unemployment growth (1996-2014)  152,260 0.0056 0.401 
Unemployment growth (1996-1999)  25,537 -0.177 0.204 
Unemployment growth (2000-2014)  126,723 0.0424 0.420 
Unemployment growth (2000-2006)  59,095 -0.0181 0.329 
Unemployment growth (2007-2014)  67,628 0.0954 0.480 
                                              Variables used for PSM: 
Unemployment (1996-1999 average)a  8518 2.689 1.857 
1991 Census: 
Employed people in agriculture, forestry and fishinga  8519 3.357 2.822 
Employed people in mininga  8519 2.478 1.422 
Employed people in manufacturinga  8519 15.50 3.663 
Employed people in constructiona  8519 6.817 1.455 
Employed people in distribution and cateringa  8519 18.71 2.609 
Employed people in transportationa  8519 5.436 1.630 
Employed people in banking and financea  8519 10.78 3.336 
Employed people in other servicesa  8519 25.11 4.402 
Self-employed workersa  8519 7.301 3.570 
Full-time workersa  8519 72.81 10.09 
Female employmenta  8519 10.24 1.469 
Inactive populationb  8519 32.80 5.996 
People whose ethnic group is whiteb  8519 96.15 8.473 
Migrants (within/between wards or from outside UK)b  8519 10.19 4.022 
Studentsb  8519 3.102 1.417 
Note: a / percentage of economically active population; b / percentage of residents. 
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A4  Pre-treatment characteristics: Cornwall, synthetic Cornwall, South Yorkshire, 
Synthetic South Yorkshire and England (1992-1999) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Source 
 Pre-treatment averages   
   
Cornwall 
 
Synthetic 
Cornwall 
 
Englande 
 
South 
Yorkshire 
Synthetic 
South 
Yorkshire 
 
Englandf 
Euros of Structural Funds per capitaa  DG Regio 26.74 20.62 11.08 28.69 25.92 11.08 
Per capita GDPa  OECD 10,980 15,665 18,054 13,840 19,640 18,155 
Population in employmentb  LFS LAD 53.23 53.77 58.57 52.20 53.69 58.51 
Economically inactive populationc  LFS LAD 41.14 40.32 36.51 41.04 39.73 36.53 
Female employmentb  LFS LAD 21.33 22.75 23.73 22.24 22.61 23.77 
Full-time workersc  LFS LAD 52.35 52.92 56.72 49.47 51.58 56.61 
Self-employed workersb  LFS LAD 11.64 7.54 7.64 5.17 5.41 7.42 
Long-term unemployment ratea  Eurostat 26.18 27.07 25.13 29.98 35.41 25.27 
Sectorial shares (percentage)         
Agriculture & Mininga Eurostat 6.28 3.07 2.39 0.6 0.88 2.19 
Manufacturinga Eurostat 11.63 16.48 16.59 18.95 18.48 16.85 
Constructiona Eurostat 5.41 4.87 4.64 5.61 4.83 4.64 
Wholesale & retail tradea Eurostat 25.80 25.34 25.90 27.33 25.66 25.95 
Financial & insurance activitiesa  Eurostat 9.68 11.97 14.25 11.78 12.50 14.33 
Real Estate; scientific activities; public 
administration and defense; educationa  
Eurostat 31.37 33.62 30.11 36.68 31.06 30.08 
Education and training         
16-19 year old in full-time educationb  LFS LAD 3.37 3.16 3.33 2.73 2.92 3.31 
Working age population with NVQ 3 or aboved  LFS LAD 33.88 33.97 36.37 31.45 33.42 36.35 
Working age population receiving job related 
trainingb  
LFS LAD 10.64 11.79 12.14 12.62 12.36 12.20 
Note: Sectorial shares and LSF LAD variables are calculated as percentage of working age population. a / 
average for 1995-1999; b / average for 1992-1999; c / average for 1993-1999; d / average for 1994-1999; 
e / average for all English regions excluding Merseyside and South Yorkshire; f / average for all English 
regions excluding Merseyside and Cornwall. 
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A5  Synthetic control method – regional weights in the synthetic Cornwall and South 
Yorkshire 
 
 
 
Region 
 
Synthetic Cornwall 
 
Synthetic South Yorkshire 
  
Weight Weight 
 Tees Valley & Durham  0.088 0.365   
 Northumberland  0.125 0.100   
 Cumbria  0 0   
 Cheshire  0 0   
 Greater Manchester  0 0.156   
 Lancashire  0 0   
 East Yorkshire  0 0.251   
 North Yorkshire  0 0   
 West Yorkshire  0 0   
 Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire  0 0   
 Leicestershire Rutland  0 0   
 Lincolnshire  0 0   
 Herefordshire Worcestershire  0 0   
 Shropshire & Staffordshire  0 0   
 West Midlands  0.212 0   
 East Anglia  0 0   
 Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire  0 0   
 Essex  0 0   
 Inner London  0 0.128   
 Outer London  0 0   
 Berkshire Buckinghamshire  0 0   
 Surrey East & West Sussex  0 0   
 Hampshire & Isle of Wight  0 0   
 Kent  0 0   
 Gloucestershire Wiltshire  0 0   
 Dorset & Somerset  0 0   
 Devon  0.575 0   
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A6  Synthetic control analysis excluding neighbouring regions 
 
 
A5.1 Cornwall vs. synthetic Cornwall, excluding Devon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A5.2 South Yorkshire vs. synthetic South Yorkshire, 
excluding regions neighbouring SY 
 
 
 
 
A7  Placebo study: treatment beginning in 1997 
 
Region  
 
Synthetic Cornwall 
  
  Weight   
 Tees Valley & Durham  0   
 Northumberland  0.052   
 Cumbria  0.305   
 Cheshire  0   
 Greater Manchester  0   
 Lancashire  0   
 East Yorkshire  0   
 North Yorkshire  0   
 West Yorkshire  0   
 Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire  0   
 Leicestershire Rutland  0   
 Lincolnshire  0   
 Herefordshire Worcestershire  0   
 Shropshire & Staffordshire  0   
 West Midlands  0.485   
 East Anglia  0   
 Bedfordshire &Hertfordshire  0   
 Essex  0   
 Inner London  0   
 Outer London  0   
 Berkshire Buckinghamshire  0   
 Surrey East & West Sussex  0   
 Hampshire & Isle of Wight  0   
 Kent  0   
 Gloucestershire Wiltshire  0   
 Dorset and Somerset  0.159   
 
Region  
Synthetic  
SY 
  
  Weight   
 Tees Valley & Durham  0.434   
 Northumberland  0.026   
 Cumbria  0.124   
 Cheshire  0   
 Greater Manchester  0.237   
 Lancashire  0   
 Leicestershire Rutland  0   
 Herefordshire Worcestershire  0   
 Shropshire & Staffordshire  0   
 West Midlands  0   
 East Anglia  0   
 Bedfordshire &Hertfordshire  0   
 Essex  0   
 Inner London  0.179   
 Outer London  0   
 Berkshire Buckinghamshire  0   
 Surrey East & West Sussex  0   
 Hampshire & Isle of Wight  0   
 Kent  0   
 Gloucestershire Wiltshire  0   
 Dorset and Somerset  0   
 Devon  0   
1
3
5
7
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015
year
South Yorkshire synthetic South Yorkshire
0
2
4
6
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015
year
Cornwall synthetic Cornwall
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Unemployment trends 1992-2014: treated vs. synthetic regions 
 
Panel A: Cornwall       Panel B: South Yorkshire  
Source: own elaboration with Nomis data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A8  Balancing tests, propensity score matching 
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 Cornwall South Yorkshire 
 Mean t-test Mean t-test 
 
Variable 
 
Treated 
(Cornwall) 
 
Control 
(matched) 
 
t 
 
p>t 
 
Treated  
(South Yorkshire) 
 
Control 
(matched) 
 
t 
 
p>t 
Unemployment (1996-1999) 3.72 3.72 0.00 0.998 4.24 4.46 -0.75 0.453 
1991 variables:         
Employed people in agriculture, forestry and 
fishinga  
7.40 6.81 0.62 0.536 0.55 0.59 -0.3 0.768 
Employed people in mininga  2.16 2.43 -0.64 0.521 4.77 5.08 -0.52 0.606 
Employed people in manufacturinga  8.67 8.39 0.6 0.550 15.62 15.05 0.88 0.379 
Employed people in constructiona  8.62 8.20 1.03 0.302 7.20 7.02 0.59 0.559 
Employed people in distribution and 
cateringa  
21.79 22.54 -0.84 0.404 18.48 17.93 0.91 0.363 
Employed people in transportationa  4.45 3.93 1.47 0.142 5.82 5.45 0.9 0.369 
Employed people in banking and financea  6.78 6.60 0.49 0.626 4.57 4.75 -0.73 0.469 
Employed people in other servicesa  26.44 26.78 -0.36 0.723 22.70 22.84 -0.13 0.896 
Self-employed workersa  11.25 10.94 0.51 0.607 4.09 3.98 0.43 0.669 
Full-time workersa  57.91 57.57 0.27 0.786 50.87 51.63 -0.73 0.466 
Female employmenta  21.38 21.39 -0.03 0.979 21.01 21.20 -0.93 0.356 
Inactive populationb 38.38 38.93 -0.66 0.511 35.39 35.64 -0.35 0.724 
People whose ethnic group is whiteb 99.49 99.44 1.19 0.237 97.22 98.01 -1.13 0.261 
Migrants (within/between wards or from 
outside UK)b 
10.39 10.93 -1.18 0.238 9.02 9.96 -1.76 0.081 
Studentsb 3.17 3.11 0.29 0.768 2.73 2.53 0.82 0.411 
no of wards 134 134   94 94   
Note: a / percentage of economically active population; b / percentage of residents. 
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